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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-4264 
_______________ 
 
WATCHUNG SPRING WATER CO., INC., 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NESTLE WATERS NORTH AMERICA INC. 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 3-14-cv-04984) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 8, 2014 
 
Before: FUENTES, FISHER, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 22, 2014) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
                                                
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Watchung Spring Water Co., Inc. (“Watchung”) appeals the District Court’s denial 
of its application by order to show cause for a preliminary injunction. 
 In 1994, Watchung and Nestlé Waters North America Inc. (“Nestlé”) entered into a 
distributor agreement that provided Watchung with an exclusive right to distribute certain 
Nestlé water products in specific counties in New Jersey.1 After executing the agreement, 
Watchung relocated from northern to southern New Jersey, and opened a facility in 
Lakewood from which it conducts all its operations. 
 Article XVI of the distributor agreement provides that the agreement shall 
automatically renew for ten successive ten-year periods unless either party notifies the 
other party in writing at least six months prior to the expiration of the current term that it 
does not intend to renew the agreement. On May 16, 2014, Nestlé sent Watchung a letter 
providing notice that it did not intend to renew the agreement beyond the term ending on 
December 31, 2014. In the following months, Nestlé proposed that Watchung serve as a 
non-exclusive distributor, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement.  
 Watchung filed a complaint and application for a preliminary injunction on August 
7, 2014, alleging that Nestlé’s termination violated the New Jersey Franchise Practices 
Act (the “Act”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:10-1 et seq., and breached the terms of the 
distributor agreement. After a hearing, the District Court denied the request for injunctive 
relief, concluding that Watchung had failed to establish likelihood of success on the 
                                                
1 Nestlé was known as Great Spring Waters of America, Inc. in 1994. 
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merits.  
 The District Court explained that the Act applies only to a franchise “the 
performance of which contemplates or requires the franchisee to establish or maintain a 
place of business within the State of New Jersey.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-4(a). “Place of 
business,” in turn, is defined as “a fixed geographical location at which the franchisee 
displays for sale and sells the franchisor’s goods or offers for sale and sells the 
franchisor’s services. Place of business shall not mean an office, a warehouse, [or] a place 
of storage.” Id. § 56:10-3(f). According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, to satisfy the 
place of business requirement, “there must be a sales location in New Jersey. Mere 
distribution through an office or warehouse would not qualify.” Instructional Sys., Inc. v. 
Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 137 (N.J. 1992) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted); see also Fischer Thompson Beverages, Inc. v. Energy Brands 
Inc., No. 07-4585, 2007 WL 3349746, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2007) (“[T]he ‘place of 
business’ requirement would at least require some substantial level of marketing to the 
customer or other sales-related interplay with customers at the location.”). 
 The District Court held that Watchung did not establish likelihood of success on 
the merits because it had significant doubts that the Lakewood facility qualifies as a place 
of business within the meaning of the Act. The distributor agreement does not contemplate 
a sales location, but instead, requires only that Watchung maintain adequate facilities for 
storing, loading, and unloading Nestlé products. In other words, Watchung is required to 
maintain what can fairly be described as a warehouse. Moreover, the District Court found 
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that the vast majority of the Lakewood facility is, in fact, used as a warehouse, and that 
direct sales to customers at the facility are not substantial.  
 On appeal, Watchung contends that the District Court erred in denying it injunctive 
relief because Nestlé’s termination violated the Act and breached the terms of the 
distributor agreement. As to its argument concerning breach of the distributor agreement,  
Watchung points out that the District Court did not address this issue. Article XX of the 
distributor agreement provides that no change, modification, extension, renewal, 
ratification, rescission, discharge, abandonment, or waiver of the agreement shall be 
binding on either party unless made in writing and signed on behalf of each party by one 
of its officers. Nestlé breached this provision, Watchung maintains, because, Jodi Elliot of 
Nestlé, who is not an officer, sent the May 2014 termination notice to Watchung. This 
argument is meritless. Article XX, which is a general integration clause, does not apply to 
non-renewal. Watchung ignores Article XVI, which specifically covers non-renewal and 
provides that either party may terminate the agreement by notifying the other party in 
writing. Article XVI says nothing about officers. If the parties wanted to require an officer 
to deliver the notice of non-renewal, it would have been easy enough for them to draft 
language to that effect in Article XVI. Furthermore, Article XX makes no sense in the 
context of non-renewal because it requires the signatures of both parties, but termination 
may, by its nature, be a unilateral act. 
 After a careful review of the record and the parties’ arguments, we find that the 
denial of Watchung’s application by order to show cause for a preliminary injunction was 
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proper. For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons substantially stated by the District 
Court, we will affirm. 
